Recently, many have begun planning for the possibility that they may fall ill and may not be able to conduct business as usual. The most commonly thought of planning device for such situations is the power of attorney (POA). A POA is a document whereby a “principal,” the person signing the document, gives certain powers to an “agent,” the person designated to act on behalf of the principal. A POA allows an individual to name another person to act on their behalf during times of incapacity, for a particular purpose, for a specified duration of time, or even to simply execute everyday dealings for the individual. It all depends upon the type of POA established and the objectives sought.

Selecting the right POA document for the situation is critical for effective execution of the principal’s wishes. Some POAs give agents the power to make healthcare decisions during the principal’s incapacity. Others allow the agent to sign legal documents or financial paperwork for an unavailable principal. Some last until incapacity, others last until the principal’s death. The general actions an agent is permitted to take depends solely on what the POA has dictated. There have been many occasions where the bounds of the four corners of a POA were tested.

A landlord of residential property is restricted on what fees can be charged to a lessee, but are these restrictions the same for assisted living facilities (ALFs)?  ALF/resident relations differ from traditional landlord/tenant relations. (For the purposes of this blog, ALF residents will be referred to as residents and landlord lessees as tenants.) While the two relationships share many similarities, ALF residents are provided with additional healthcare monitoring and services that a landlord would not be expected to provide.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was recently presented with the opportunity to distinguish between the permissible charges landlords and ALFs may charge their tenants/residents. Landlord-tenant law falls under the restrictions of Massachusetts Security Deposit Statute, where ALFs are bound by the state’s ALF statutes – both laws being very similar in nature. (ALFs are called assisted living residences (ALRs) in Massachusetts.  For purposes of this writing, the more common ALF will be used.) Courts in the state were split on the issue of the extent that the security deposit statute might apply to ALF residents; and, if so, whether ALF statutes permitted additional charges beyond those listed in the security deposit statute.

Due-on-sale clauses are a common element of most mortgages and other loans. The provision is a protection for lenders specifying that if property rights of an encumbered asset are transferred, the lender has the right to demand immediate payment for any amounts due from the debtor. A transfer could be any change in the debtor’s rights to the property – like selling a home or quitclaiming a deed. Logically, upon the sale of a home, a lender would want to recover the balance of the loan owed by the debtor-seller. The original note may say that the debtor has 100 more months to pay, but with the due-on-sale clause, payment is due right away due to the transfer. Fortunately though, not all transfers are treated as “transfers” that trigger the clause.

When there is a dispute as to whether the due-on-sale clause has been activated, challengers look to two different authorities for guidance: the Garn-St. Germain Act and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Debtors look to the former; lenders look to the latter. Frustratingly, the two provisions do not align entirely.