In the past month, we have seen significant developments in estate planning, business law, elder law, and special needs law. We have highlighted the most noteworthy developments to ensure you and your firm stay informed of any changes. From the Internal Revenue Service’s safe harbor provision for the staking of digital assets held in a trust to a ruling denying a private right of action under the Medicaid Act and a decision upholding the constitutionality of the Corporate Transparency Act, read on to learn how these decisions may impact your practice.

Estate Planning

IRS Provides Safe Harbor for Staking of Digital Assets, Preserving Qualification of Investment and Grantor Trusts for Federal Income Tax Purposes

Rev. Proc. 2025-31, 2025-48 I.R.B. 743 (Nov. 22, 2025)

On November 22, 2025, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Rev. Proc. 2025-31, which describes the following safe harbor: A trust can authorize staking (a consensus mechanism used to validate transactions on a blockchain) of digital assets, and the resulting staking of the trust’s digital assets does not prevent the trust from qualifying as an investment trust under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) and a grantor trust under I.R.C. §§ 671–679 for federal income tax purposes—allowing passthrough tax treatment for investors and simplified tax reporting—provided certain requirements are met. 

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) provides that an “investment” trust is not classified as a trust if the trust agreement provides a power to vary the investment of the certificate holders (e.g., to improve the certificate holders’ investments). An investment trust with a single class of ownership interests, representing undivided beneficial interests in the trust’s assets, is classified as a trust if there is no power under the trust agreement to vary the investments of the certificate holders. 

The safe harbor applies if 14 requirements set forth in Rev. Proc. 2025-31, section 6.02, are met. To fall within the safe harbor, the interests held by the trust must be publicly traded and comply with Securities and Exchange Commission rules and regulations, the trust may hold only cash and a single type of digital asset. It must meet a variety of requirements regarding custody, liquidity policies and procedures, and operations rules. The trust agreement must prohibit the trust from seeking to take advantage of market fluctuations to improve the investments of trust interest holders, including fluctuations based on the value of the digital assets or the amount of staking rewards. Further, the only new assets the trust may receive from staking the digital assets it holds are additional units in the same form of the same type of digital asset the trust holds.

The safe harbor applies to tax years ending on or after November 10, 2025. An existing trust may amend its trust agreement to authorize staking at any time during the nine-month period beginning November 10, 2025, and such an amendment will not prevent a trust from being treated as an investment trust or a grantor trust for federal tax purposes if the safe harbor requirements are met.

Takeaways: Taxpayers with digital assets held in trust have been concerned that the IRS would deem staking activities for digital assets to be a power enabling a trust to vary the investments of certificate holders in a way that improves their investments rather than merely preserving the trust’s assets, precluding the trust from qualifying as an investment trust and as a grantor trust. Compliance with the safe harbor provided by Rev. Proc. 2025-31 will ensure they can take advantage of the tax benefits of qualifying as an investment trust and a grantor trust.

Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges Applies When Trustee Pursues Claim Against Beneficiary

In re Hempt, No. 1340 MDA 2024, No. 1341 MDA 2024, 2025 WL 3167870 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2025)

Gerald Hempt was the co-administrator of his aunt’s estate and the trustee of a trust established by his father. Max Hempt was a beneficiary of both the trust and the estate. In 2016, Max became entitled to receive shares of stock from the trust, subject to his payment of the applicable taxes. Max demanded immediate distribution of the shares, but Gerald did not want to distribute them until they were valued and Max’s tax liability was calculated. In 2017, Max and Gerald entered into a receipt, release, and indemnification agreement, whereby Max acknowledged his obligation to pay a portion of the taxes on the shares and to indemnify Gerald, individually and as trustee, for sums expended to pay those taxes. The trust paid over $1 million in taxes after the distribution of Max’s shares, but Max refused to repay the trust. In 2021, Gerald, as trustee, filed a civil action alleging that Max had breached the agreement. 

Max filed a counterclaim, seeking a full accounting of Gerald’s management of the trust and Gerald’s removal as trustee in the event of any breach of his fiduciary duties. Gerald filed partial accountancy of the trust and the estate, but Max objected to both accounts and requested the production of additional documents. Gerald objected on the grounds of the attorney-client or work-product privileges. However, the orphans’ court ordered that Gerald, as trustee, must disclose all documents relating to the administration of the estate, including attorneys’ opinions he had obtained for the administration of the trust, excepting only attorneys’ opinions obtained for his personal protection as trustee in the course of or in anticipation of litigation. Gerald appealed.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that, although evidentiary privileges are generally not favored, the attorney-client privilege is protected and revered under Pennsylvania law. In addition, the work-product privilege is recognized under Pennsylvania’s rules of civil procedure. However, in Pennsylvania, there is a fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine: Communications between a trustee and their attorney are not privileged for those to whom the trustee owes a fiduciary duty, where the communications are sought in connection with the trust’s management, including disputes about trust administration, because trust law imposes a duty on the trustee to make such information available to the trust’s beneficiaries. Under Pennsylvania precedent, the fiduciary exception does not apply where the trustee’s interests differ from those of the beneficiaries and the attorney’s opinions are provided to the trustee for the trustee’s personal protection during the course of adversarial proceedings between the trustee and beneficiary. 

The court determined that the present case was distinguishable from Pennsylvania precedent. The litigation did not involve a challenge by Max, as beneficiary, to Gerald’s exercise of his fiduciary duties as trustee in executing the trust’s provisions. Instead, it involved an ancillary matter: whether Max, the beneficiary, owed money to the trust under the indemnification agreement, which Gerald, as trustee, had initiated a civil action to enforce. The court held that protecting Gerald’s communications with his attorney regarding the trust’s civil action against Max furthered the goals of the attorney-client and work-product privileges. It did so the same way that excluding a trustee’s communications with their counsel regarding personal protection in an attack by a beneficiary on their performance from the scope of the fiduciary exception does so: In both situations, failing to protect privileged communications would discourage a trustee from being candid with their attorney, which in turn would prevent the attorney from providing appropriate advice. Moreover, the attorney would fear that their work product could be used against their trustee client. 

Further, the court held that a trustee should not be deprived of the confidential assistance of counsel in seeking the repayment of a debt owed by a beneficiary to the trust, just as the trustee should not be deprived of assistance with a beneficiary’s allegations of trustee misconduct. Therefore, the court held that privileged communications are outside the scope of the fiduciary exception not only when a trustee solicits advice from an attorney in defense of trustee mismanagement claims, but also when a trustee is pursuing a claim against a beneficiary on behalf of the trust. Therefore, the court reversed the orphans’ court’s order to the extent that it required Gerald to produce communications with counsel and counsel’s work product related to the civil action against Max for breach of the agreement. It affirmed the order in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Takeaways: It is important for attorneys to become familiar with their state’s laws regarding the scope of privileges in the fiduciary context: The attorney-client privilege is recognized by all states and federal law, and the work-product privilege is widely accepted, but the fiduciary exception is not universally recognized. Although many courts have recognized the fiduciary exception, a few states have limited or eliminated it by statute (see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3333; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.5021; N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 4503; S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-110) or have declined to adopt it at common law. Further, even in states that have adopted the fiduciary exception, its scope may vary.

New York Taxpayers Did Not Manifest Intent to Change Their Domicile to Florida

In re Hoff and Ocorr-Hoff, No. 850209 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Oct. 9, 2025)

John Hoff and Kathleen Ocorr-Hoff (the Hoffs) purchased a condominium in Florida in 2015, but continued to live, work, and file income tax returns as residents of New York until 2018. For 2018, they filed an income tax return reporting their Florida address, asserting that they were part-year residents of New York and had moved out of New York on October 29, 2018. For 2019, the Hoffs reported that they were nonresidents of New York. In 2020, the New York Division of Taxation audited their 2018 and 2019 returns and issued a notice of deficiency for $59,648.00, plus penalties and interest based on its determination that they remained domiciled in New York in 2018 and 2019. Despite their protest of the notice, the tax deficiency was sustained, and they filed a petition with the Division of Tax Appeals. The administrative law judge (ALJ) also concluded that the Hoffs had failed to show they had changed their domicile for the period in question.

On appeal, the New York Tax Appeal Tribunal noted that the Division of Taxation’s notices are presumed to be correct and that the challenger has the burden of proving the notice was incorrect and did not have a rational basis. The tribunal further noted that although a party’s domicile is determined by their subjective intent, proof of their intent rests on an examination of objective criteria. Under N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b), for tax purposes, a person is a New York resident if they are domiciled in New York, unless (1) they do not have a permanent place of abode in New York, they do have a permanent place of abode elsewhere, and they spend 30 days or less in New York or (2) they have a permanent place of abode in New York and spend more than 183 days of the year there, regardless of their domicile. Domicile is defined in New York regulations as the place a person intends to make their permanent home and to which they intend to return.

The tribunal, after examining several objective factors—home, time, business ties, social ties, family ties, and other evidence—determined that although the Hoffs intended to eventually change their domicile to Florida, they had not manifested that intent in 2018 or 2019. During those years, they spent more time in New York than in Florida, retained their New York residence, had substantial business ties in New York, and had memberships in two New York country clubs. Although the Hoffs provided documentation, including Florida driver’s licenses, voter registration, a Declaration of Florida Domicile, and the creation of trusts and wills subject to Florida law, the tribunal noted precedent that such formal declarations of domicile could be self-serving and are less significant than informal acts or declarations revealing a person’s general habit of life. The Hoff’s documentation showed only their intention to eventually relocate to Florida. It did not negate other evidence that they regarded New York as the place they intended to return to, and thus their domicile, in 2018 and 2019.

The tribunal affirmed the ALJ’s determination and sustained the notice of deficiency.

Takeaways: The tribunal acknowledged that minimizing tax exposure is a legitimate reason for establishing a domicile, but taxpayers must clearly manifest their intention via objective criteria and other verifiable information that they regard a new state as their permanent place of abode. Attorneys should advise clients that merely spending time in another state (even substantial time) and providing documentation that the new state is their domicile may be insufficient to avoid taxation in the original state, where other circumstances and behaviors tend to negate their intention to regard the new state as their permanent home.

Elder Law and Special Needs Law

Tenth Circuit: Medicaid Act’s Reasonable Promptness Provision Does Not Confer Private Right of Action Under Section 1983

Lancaster v. Cartmell, No. 25-6000, 2025 WL 3714369 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025)

Max and Peggy Lancaster (the Lancasters) transferred $3.8 million in assets to a limited liability company (LLC) owned by their three adult children. The LLC executed a loan agreement, real estate mortgages, personal guarantees, and a promissory note in consideration for the Lancasters’ transfer of assets. Following the transfer, the Lancasters applied for Medicaid benefits. Their applications were denied because their financial resources exceeded Medicaid’s asset limit. 

The Lancasters sued the directors of the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the Oklahoma Health Care Authority (the Agencies) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they had violated the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), by failing to provide Medicaid benefits to them as eligible individuals with reasonable promptness. The Agencies moved to dismiss, arguing that the LLC’s promissory note payable to the Lancasters was a countable resource that caused their resources to exceed the threshold for Medicaid eligibility. The federal district court granted the motion. The Lancasters appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Before oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court decided Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025), holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A)—the “any-qualified-provider” provision of the Medicaid Act—did not clearly and unambiguously confer an individually enforceable right under section 1983. The Agencies filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that Medina was a supervening change in the law that also applied to section 1396a(a)(8), which they argued did not clearly and unambiguously confer an individually enforceable right under section 1983. The Lancasters argued that section 1396a(a)(8) was distinguishable from the provision addressed in Medina, relying on Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004), in which the Third Circuit held that section 1396a(a)(8) conferred a private right of action under section 1983. The Tenth Circuit denied summary disposition.

The Tenth Circuit ultimately ruled that the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Medina required it to conclude that section 1396a(a)(8) did not clearly and unambiguously confer an individually enforceable right under section 1983. Under Medina, the Supreme Court established a stringent and demanding test to determine whether a federal statute confers individually enforceable rights under section 1983: The plaintiff must show that the statute at issue clearly and unambiguously uses right-creating terms, displaying an unmistakable focus on individuals such as the plaintiff. In Medina, the Supreme Court noted that the typical remedy for violations of the Medicaid Act, a spending-power statute that addresses a state’s obligations to the federal government, was for the federal government to terminate funds to the state; therefore, it was unlikely to confer a privately enforceable right under section 1983.

The Tenth Circuit, relying on Medina, held that, like section 1396a(a)(23)(A), section 1396a(a)(8) was part of a subsection of the Medicaid Act listing requirements that states must substantially comply with to receive Medicaid funding. Although section 1396a(a)(8) included more mandatory terms and directives for states to comply with, that alone did not establish an individually enforceable right of action. Thus, section 1396a(a)(8) was not a rare exception that conferred an individual right of action under a Medicaid provision enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending power. 

Further, the court rejected the Third Circuit’s analysis in Sabree v. Richman, holding that in Medina, the US Supreme Court had repudiated the reasoning in the case law the Third Circuit had relied upon in Sabree. As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Lancasters’ suit.

Takeaways: The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lancaster is significant in that it rejects an on-point, Third Circuit decision in which the court had found that section 1396a(a)(8) did confer a private right of action under section 1983 based on the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Medina, which applied a more demanding test for spending-power statutes such as the Medicaid Act, requiring the plaintiff to show that the statute clearly and unambiguously uses right-creating terms. Consequently, those whose Medicaid applications are denied must instead rely on the administrative appeal processes provided within the Medicaid Act itself.

Untimeliness of Claim in Probate Proceeding Does Not Bar Medicaid Estate Recovery

Montana Dep’t Pub. Health & Hum. Serv. v. Johnson, 580 P.3d 74 (Mont. Dec. 2, 2025)

Florence Pound died intestate at age 77 in April 2023. The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (the Department) had paid $5,360.89 in Medicaid benefits on Florence’s behalf after she reached age 55. Florence’s home, which was the sole asset of her estate, was valued at $200,000 at the time of her death. Her daughter, Minta Johnson, was her sole heir. Minta applied for probate on May 1, 2023. As personal representative for the estate, Minta published a notice to creditors on May 12, 19, and 26, 2023, in a local newspaper pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-801. The Department presented its creditor’s claim to recover the Medicaid benefits from Florence’s estate on September 13, 2023, one day after the expiration of the four-month period for creditors to file timely claims under section 72-3-801. The probate court denied the Department’s claim and distributed the estate to Minta.

The Department filed a lawsuit against Minta in district court seeking to recover Medicaid benefits under Mont. Code Ann. § 53-6-167(2), which states that it may assert a claim against a person who has received property of the Medicaid recipient by distribution or survival. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Minta, finding that the Department’s claim was untimely under section 72-3-801. In addition, the district court held that the Department’s claim was barred by issue preclusion because the issues before the district court were identical to those that the probate court had decided, and Minta was in privity with the decedent. The Department appealed.

In a de novo review, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the Department has a duty, under federal legislation, to recover Medicaid benefits paid to a recipient after the recipient’s death to ensure the program remains adequately funded. In evaluating whether the Department was barred from filing an action under Mont. Code Ann. § 53-6-167(2), following the probate court’s denial of its untimely creditor’s claim, the court recognized that, to the extent possible, it must harmonize statutes that touch on the same subject matter and give effect to each of them.

Mont. Code Ann. § 53-6-167(1) states that the Department shall present a claim against the Medicaid recipient’s estate within the time specified in the published notice to creditors in an estate proceeding for the total amount paid. In addition, Mont. Code Ann. § 53-6-167(2) states that the Department may bring an action in district court to collect the amount paid on the decedent’s behalf against a person who has received the deceased Medicaid recipient’s property by distribution. Mont. Code Ann. § 53-6-167(6) states that the Department may seek recovery under either subsection 53-6-167(1) or subsection 53-6-167(2), or both, until its claim is satisfied in full.

The court rejected Minta’s assertion that the mandatory language used in subsection 53-6-167(1)—that the Department shall present a timely claim in the estate proceeding—meant that, if the Department’s claim was untimely, it was precluded from seeking to recover the amount owed from her under subsection 53-6-167(2). According to the court, such an interpretation would ignore the express cause of action created by subsection 53-6-167(2) and render that subsection meaningless because it operates only after the decedent’s property has passed through a probated estate or other arrangement to the decedent’s survivor, heir, assignee, or beneficiary. The court found that the legislature intended to grant the Department wide latitude to recover Medicaid payments and that subsection 53-6-167(2) provided an alternative path. Section 53-6-167 creates two separate claims: one against the estate of the Medicaid recipient and an alternative one against a person who received property from the Medicaid recipient’s estate.

The court reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to enter judgment in favor of the Department.

Takeaways: Federal law requires state Medicaid agencies to recover Medicaid expenditures after the recipient’s death. Attorneys must be cognizant that state law may provide avenues to recovering funds not only from the estate of the Medicaid beneficiary but also from beneficiaries who benefit from a recipient’s estate or trust.

New York to Pass Medical Aid in Dying Act

N.Y. S138/A136

On December 17, 2025, New York Governor Kathy Hochul entered into an agreement with New York’s legislature to permit medically assisted suicide. A bill previously passed by the legislature will be amended to include additional safeguards to ensure patients cannot be coerced into medically assisted suicide and to protect doctors and facilities who object to assisted suicide from being forced to participate in it. According to a press release, the amended bill will be passed and signed in January 2026 and will become effective six months later.

Takeaways: New York will join a minority of states—California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—and the District of Columbia that currently allow medically assisted suicide.

Business Law

Eleventh Circuit Holds Corporate Transparency Act Constitutional; New York LLC Transparency Act Amendment Vetoed

Nat’l Small Bus. United v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 161 F.4th 1323 (11th Cir. 2025)

In March 2024, the federal district court for the Northern District of Alabama enjoined the enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), which requires reporting companies to disclose beneficial ownership information (BOI), against the named plaintiffs. The court held that the CTA was unconstitutional because it was not an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the CTA facially regulates economic activity and thus is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The court determined that (1) the CTA regulates activity that is economic in nature by prohibiting anonymous corporate dealings, regulating commercial entities such as LLCs and corporations that are commercial in nature and thus are in the stream of commerce, and requiring those entities to report BOI, and (2) Congress rationally concluded that anonymous corporate dealings have a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce. 

In addition, the court held that the CTA does not facially violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures because it was not applied arbitrarily, but instead was a uniform reporting requirement that applied to all businesses that are reporting companies under the CTA, and it provided those companies with privacy protections by permitting disclosure of BOI only to certain agencies.

N.Y. S.B. S8432

New York’s LLC Transparency Act (see N.Y. LLC Law §§ 1106, 1107), which imposes reporting obligations for LLCs formed or operated in New York, was originally signed into law in December 2023 and incorporated the CTA’s definition of a reporting company. In June 2025, in response to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) issuance of an interim final rule limiting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act’s (CTA) BOI reporting requirements to foreign reporting companies and exempting domestic reporting companies and US persons, New York’s legislature passed an amendment to the LLC Transparency Act to ensure that the state’s beneficial ownership reporting system would include all LLCs formed in New York, as well as foreign LLCs registered to do business in New York. 

However, on December 19, 2025, Governor Kathy Hochul vetoed the amendment, limiting the scope of the LLC Transparency Act to reporting companies as defined in the federal interim final rule, which does not require US entities and persons to report BOI, but only requires BOI to be provided by reporting companies formed under the laws of a foreign country. Under the LLC Transparency Act, existing LLCs formed under foreign law prior to its January 1, 2026, effective date must submit a BOI report to the New York Department of State by January 1, 2027, and those formed after the effective date must submit their report within 30 days of their foreign registration.

Takeaways: Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling on the constitutionality of the CTA, most small businesses do not currently need to comply with its reporting requirements. However, it is important to keep in mind that if the CTA is not repealed, a future administration that favors it may decide to enforce its requirements against domestic reporting companies and US persons.

Governor Hochul’s veto of amendments to New York’s LLC Transparency Act means that the definition of a reporting company will continue to have the meaning set forth in the CTA and its regulations, including the Interim Final Rule. Therefore, in New York, only LLCs formed under foreign law that are registered to do business in New York must submit the required reports to the New York Department of State.

New York and California Enact Statutes to Restrict Stay-or-Pay Agreements

N.Y. Lab. Law art. 37, §§ 1050–1055 

On December 19, 2025, New York’s Governor Kathy Hochul signed the Trapped at Work Act (the Act) into law, effective immediately. The Act prohibits employers from requiring workers to execute an employment promissory note or similar provision requiring the worker to pay the employer a sum of money as reimbursement for training if the worker leaves their employment before the passage of a stated period of time as a condition of their employment. However, the Act does not prohibit agreements (1) requiring a worker to repay their employer sums advanced, except sums advanced for training related to their employment; (2) requiring the worker to pay for property the employer sold or leased to the worker; (3) requiring educational personnel to comply with any terms or conditions of sabbatical leaves granted by their employer; (4) entered into as part of a program agreed to by the employer and its workers’ collective bargaining representative. 

The Act entitles workers to recover attorney’s fees if they successfully defend a suit brought by the employer to enforce an agreement prohibited by the Act. Employers who violate the Act may be fined $1,000 to 5,000 for each violation.

Notably, on January 6, 2026, the New York legislature proposed amendments providing for a new effective date of December 19, 2026, narrowing the scope of the Act to employees rather than all workers, and clarifying and expanding provisions addressing agreements the Act does not prohibit.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16608 & Cal. Lab. Code § 926

Effective January 1, 2026, pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16608, California employers are prohibited from requiring workers, as a condition of their employment or work relationship, to execute a contract (1) requiring the worker to pay the employer or other specified party for a debt if the working relationship terminates, (2) authorizing the employer to resume or initiate collection of a debt upon termination, or (3) imposing a penalty or fee on the work upon termination. Certain agreements, such as contracts entered into under government loan-repayment assistance programs, contracts related to enrollment in certain apprenticeship programs, and certain financial bonuses at the outset of employment not tied to job performance, are not prohibited, provided they meet specified conditions. Retention bonuses paid after the start of employment may not include a repayment obligation.

Under Cal. Lab. Code § 926, a worker or class of workers may bring a private civil action against the employer that has violated section 16608 for the greater of the actual damages the worker has incurred or $5,000 per worker, as well as attorney’s fees.

Takeaways: Attorneys representing New York and California employers should inform them of the new statutes and recommend the necessary changes to the relevant contracts to ensure compliance. of AI.

Important Related Legal Developments

Postmark May Not Align With Date US Postal Service Accepts Possession of Mail

Postmarks and Postal Possession, 39 C.F.R. pt. 111 (Nov. 24, 2025)

On November 24, 2025, the US Postal Service (USPS) adopted a new final rule, effective December 24, 2025, aimed at improving the public understanding of postmarks and their relationship to the date of mailing. The rule clarifies that the postmark date may not align with the date the USPS first accepted possession of a piece of mail because postmarks may be applied at a processing facility rather than at the actual time and place where the USPS took possession; thus, the postmark may be applied several days after the date the USPS accepted the piece of mail. The presence of the postmark confirms only that the USPS accepted custody of the mail and that the piece of mail was in its possession on the date of the postmark.

Takeaways: Because the date of the postmark may be several days later than the date a piece of mail was accepted by the USPS, clients who must meet deadlines that rely on a postmark, including filing tax returns, which are deemed to be filed on the date of the postmark, as well as court filings or contractual notice provisions governed by the postmark date, should be advised to request a manual postmark, purchase a Certificate of Mailing, or use certified or registered mail. Some delivery services other than the USPS also provide verifiable mailing dates.