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In the past month, we have seen significant developments in estate planning, business law, elder law, and special needs planning. We have highlighted the most noteworthy developments to ensure you and your firm stay informed of any changes. From a new Florida statute providing a summary procedure for trustee discharge and cases involving a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, the resolution of a circuit split by the US Supreme Court regarding jurisdiction in arbitration proceedings, and the imposition of sanctions in a trust dispute for the use of fictitious artificial intelligence (AI)-generated citations, read on to learn how these developments may impact your practice.
Estate Planning
New Florida Statute Provides Summary Procedure for Trustee Discharge
Fla. S.B. 786
On April 29, 2026, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed Senate Bill 786, which amended the Florida Trust Code to create a summary procedure for the discharge of a trustee of an irrevocable trust who has substantially complied with their statutory duties to provide trust beneficiaries with the required information and accountings.
To initiate the procedure, the trustee must provide beneficiaries with certain disclosures, a plan of distribution, contact information, a statement of termination of the trust or that the trustee has resigned or been removed (whichever is applicable), and a notice that claims against the trustee will be barred unless a beneficiary submits a written objection to the trustee within 60 days after sending the disclosure document. If a beneficiary objects within 60 days, the summary procedure will not be available.
Takeaways: In Florida, a trustee’s path to discharge previously required one of three approaches: securing a signed waiver and release from each beneficiary, negotiating a nonjudicial settlement agreement, or filing a court petition for approval of a final accounting and an order of discharge. The summary procedure will enable trustees to avoid the time and expense associated with those methods. Beneficiaries who receive the trust disclosure document must object promptly to avoid waiving any claims they wish to assert against trustees.
Trust Beneficiary Whose Litigation Benefited only Her Share of Trust Property, Not the Trust as a Whole, Not Awarded Attorney’s Fees
In re Robert W. Ashcraft Trust, No. 372846, 2026 WL 679590 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2026)
Susan Nazem was co-trustee of the Robert W. Ashcraft Revocable Living Trust (the Trust) along with her brothers, Robert and William Ashcroft. Susan and her daughter used a cottage that was the remaining physical asset of the Trust. Robert and William learned that a property tax bill for the cottage had not been paid. After investigating, they petitioned the probate court to remove Susan as co-trustee pursuant to the Trust’s terms, which provided that a majority of the Trust’s beneficiaries could vote to remove her. The cottage was sold, and the proceeds were held in the Trust. Although Robert and William never gave Susan notice of their intention to charge rent against her share of the final distribution, they sent her a final distribution schedule that reduced her share by $35,137.50 for litigation costs and rent for the 39 months during which she and her daughter used the cottage. Susan filed a petition challenging the final distribution, but the probate court determined that she had breached her fiduciary duty as co-trustee by using the cottage, along with her daughter, without paying rent. The court determined that she would be surcharged $6,350 for two months of rent and her brothers’ attorney’s fees instead of the more than $35,000 that Robert and William had proposed.
Susan then filed a petition seeking reasonable attorney’s fees under Mich. Comp. Law § 700.7904(1). The probate court denied her petition for attorney’s fees. Susan appealed.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed the probate court’s decision to award attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. The court noted that although Michigan generally applies the “American Rule,” under which a party may not recover attorney’s fees unless it is permitted pursuant to a statute, court rule, or common law exception, Michigan Compiled Laws section 700.7904(1) permits attorney’s fees and costs for breaches of trust under some circumstances. Section 700.7904(1) provides, “In a proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court, as justice and equity require, may award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, to any party who enhances, preserves, or protects trust property, to be paid from the trust that is the subject of the proceeding.” (emphasis added).
The court found that the plain language of the statute, which provides that the probate court “may” award reasonable attorney’s fees, showed that the decision to award attorney’s fees was permissive and in the discretion of the court, which may do so as appropriate and as justice and equity require. The court also looked to Becht v Miller, 273 N.W. 294 (Mich. 1937), a case decided before the enactment of section 700.7904(1), in which the court held that attorney’s fees may be paid from a trust where the litigation benefited the entire trust and was necessary to avoid fraud, laches, or negligence. In Becht, the petitioner-beneficiary found $40,000 in trust property that the executrix of the estate had improperly hidden. The court awarded the beneficiary attorney’s fees because her actions benefited the entire estate rather than just one interested individual or group of individuals.
The court rejected Susan’s contention that her actions had revealed improper conduct by Robert and William and had preserved Trust property from undue depletion. Rather, the court found that her litigation benefited only her share of the Trust property and thus did not meet the threshold of section 700.7904(1), i.e., enhancing, preserving, or protecting the Trust property. Further, it found that her assertion that she was entitled to attorney’s fees because she enforced the settlor’s original intent of equal distribution was insufficient to meet the standard set forth in section 700.7904(1). The court affirmed the probate court’s judgment, holding that the probate court had not erred or abused its discretion.
Takeaways: Most states have adopted some variation of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC). UTC section 709 authorizes trustees to recover expenses incurred in the administration of a trust. In addition, UTC section 1004—similar to Michigan Compiled Laws section 700.7904(1)—allows a court to award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to a party in a case involving administration of a trust as justice and equity require. The comment to section 1004 notes that a court may award litigation costs to a trust beneficiary if the litigation is deemed beneficial to the trust.
In In re Robert W. Ashcraft Trust, litigation could likely have been avoided if Susan and the trustees had entered into a residential lease agreement obligating Susan to make rental payments for her use of the cottage and defining the parties’ other obligations—for example, whether Susan, as a beneficiary, rather than the co-trustees jointly, was required to pay the property tax bill. WealthCounsel recently added a residential lease agreement to the Advanced Planning Techniques module in Wealth Docx®.
Elder Law and Special Needs Law
Eleventh Circuit: Section 1983 Confers a Private Right of Action to Enforce Section 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act
L.W. v. Comm’r of the Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 24-12774, 2026 WL 1379853 (11th Cir. May 18, 2026)
L.W. was a three-year-old boy with a rare metabolic disease that put him at risk of potentially deadly episodes of hypoglycemia. To maintain appropriate glucose levels, L.W. needed constant monitoring and nutrition via a gastrostomy tube (G-tube) at least every three hours. When L.W. and his family lived in Virginia, he received 96 hours of care per week from Virginia’s Medicaid program, consisting of 56 hours per week of private nursing care and 40 hours per week from a program that paid L.W.’s mother to provide his care.
When the family moved to Georgia, L.W.’s mother applied for 56 hours per week of nursing care through the Georgia Pediatric Program (GAPP). Through GAPP, Georgia offers Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) services to all Medicaid-eligible patients under age 21 as required by the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a). No Georgia program would compensate L.W.’s mother for providing care. The EPSDT program requires participating states to provide several categories of services, including a catch-all category that includes private duty nursing services sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to correct or ameliorate a recipient’s medical condition. Georgia’s Department of Community Health (DCH) contracted with Alliant Health Solutions to review requests for services and allocate resources for the GAPP program.
Alliant approved only 21 hours per week of private nursing services for L.W., stating that its determination was based on L.W.’s current medically necessary needs, which included G-tube feedings, glucose monitoring, and medication administration. Alliant provided no further explanation for its determination that 21 hours per week was sufficient to correct or ameliorate L.W.’s condition. Alliant also denied two subsequent requests by L.W.’s mother, through L.W.’s treating physician, for an increase in nursing hours, stating that she had failed to demonstrate a change in L.W.’s medical condition that justified the increases as required by GAPP. L.W.’s mother experienced sleep deprivation and occasionally slept through alarms set to wake her up for L.W.’s nighttime feedings. Once, L.W. required emergency treatment for low glucose levels and a week of hospitalization.
L.W.’s mother sued the Commissioner of the Georgia DCH under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that he had violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8) and (a)(10)(A) of the Medicaid Act and the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide L.W. with the EPSDT services to which he was entitled. L.W.’s mother also sought—and the federal district court granted—a preliminary injunction requiring the Commissioner to provide at least 100 hours of private nursing care per week to L.W., to evaluate future care requests using the statutory “correct or ameliorate” standard, and consider future requests on a case-by-case basis. The Commissioner appealed.
In reviewing the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that it and many sister circuits had previously recognized that § 1983 creates a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(8), which guarantees eligible individuals the opportunity to apply for and receive Medicaid services. Further, in Moore ex rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011), the court had adopted the standard for assessing the type of claim L.W. was asserting. When determining how many hours of private nursing care are medically necessary for Medicaid patients, the state may limit those services based on a medical expert’s opinion if
the limitations do not discriminate on the basis of diagnosis, type of illness or condition and the services provided are sufficient in amount and duration to reasonably achieve the purpose of correcting or ameliorating the patient’s condition. Importantly, we instructed that when a state Medicaid agency has exceeded the bounds of its authority by adopting an unreasonable definition of medical necessity or by failing to ensure that a required service is sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose, aggrieved Medicaid recipients have recourse in the courts.
L.W. v. Comm’r of the Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 24-12774, 2026 WL 1379853, at *3 (11th Cir. May 18, 2026) (citations omitted).
The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the state was not required to meet the statutory standard if it relied on a reasonable regulation—i.e., that there must be a change in the patient’s medical condition—to deny medically necessary care. The court determined that Georgia Medicaid’s policy must meet the statutory standard even if the policy is reasonable.
The court found that Georgia’s “change” policy was not responsive to L.W.’s claim that 21 hours of nursing care had never met the statutory standard because it was insufficient in amount, duration, or scope to achieve the ameliorative purpose of EPSDT. Further, the court ruled that the Commissioner’s position was inconsistent with the plain language of the Medicaid Act, which requires states to provide care—in all cases, not just some—that is sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to correct or ameliorate patients’ conditions.
The court found that the district court had not clearly erred in its factual finding that L.W. was likely not receiving sufficient medical care. Evidence in the record supported its finding: L.W. had received 96 hours of care per week in Virginia. Since moving to Georgia, where he received only 21 hours of care per week, his glucose levels had become dangerously low several times. In addition, L.W.’s mother and his doctor testified that his parents’ efforts to provide 24-hour care were unsustainable and that the lack of additional nursing care had seriously jeopardized his health.
The court further held that L.W. was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his case to the federal district court.
The court found that L.W. was at risk of irreparable harm: The harm caused by Georgia Medicaid’s insufficient care was irreparable because it concerned his health and could lead to his death. The equities favored L.W. because the potential harm to him outweighed any financial burden on the state resulting from the injunction.
In addition, the court found that it was within the district court’s discretion to not require the bond of at least $64,716.80 requested by the Commissioner.
Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order entering a preliminary injunction in favor of L.W.
Takeaways: Circuits are split on whether individuals have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). In Lancaster v. Cartmell, No. 25-6000, 2025 WL 3714369 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that § 1396a(a)(8) did not confer an individually enforceable right under § 1983 (for additional discussion, see WealthCounsel’s January 2026 monthly update). The Lancaster court adopted the reasoning of the US Supreme Court in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025), in which the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A)—the “any-qualified-provider” provision of the Medicaid Act—did not clearly and unambiguously confer an individually enforceable right under § 1983. As a result, the issue of whether § 1396a(a)(8) confers an individually enforceable right under § 1983 may ultimately be determined by the US Supreme Court. In the meantime, the recourse available to Medicaid recipients whose Medicaid applications are denied depends upon the Circuit Court of Appeals to which their state is assigned. Those within the Tenth Circuit must rely on the administrative appeal processes provided in the Medicaid Act rather than asserting a private right of action arising from § 1396a(a)(8).
Notably, in L.W. v. Comm’r of the Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, the court stated in a footnote that it had not addressed the Commissioner’s argument that the court should reconsider its precedents and hold that the relevant provisions of the Medicaid Act are not enforceable under § 1983. The court determined that the argument, raised for the first time in the Commissioner’s reply brief, was not properly before it.
Maine Explicitly Recognizes Right to Effective Counsel in Guardianship and Conservatorship Proceedings, Applying Strickland Standard
Guardianship of R., No. Cum-25-331, 2026 WL 1292166 (Me. May 12, 2026).
R. had experienced multiple strokes and suffered from vascular dementia. He lived in an assisted living facility and required help with activities of daily living such as washing, dressing, and taking medications. In 2022, the probate court appointed the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) as R.’s guardian. In 2024, R. filed a petition to terminate the guardianship, and the DHHS filed a petition for the appointment of a conservator, nominating itself. The probate court denied R’s petition to terminate his guardianship and appointed the DHHS as his conservator. R. appealed, asserting that the probate court had erred in not terminating his guardianship and in appointing a conservator. He also argued that his attorney was ineffective.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine noted the probate court’s factual findings, including R.’s poor memory and lack of insight about his limitations; aggressiveness toward the staff at the assisted living facility; repeated falls and hospitalizations; a large inheritance from his deceased mother’s estate; and a history of giving money to a woman he had never met but believed was his girlfriend. The court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the probate court’s findings that termination of R.’s guardianship was inappropriate and that the appointment of a conservator was necessary.
The court also addressed R.’s contention that his attorney’s failure to obtain an independent psychological evaluation of him before the probate court hearing was prejudicially deficient. The court noted precedent holding that, where there is a right to counsel, there is also a right to effective counsel. For the first time, the court explicitly recognized that adults who are the subject of guardianship or conservatorship proceedings or who seek the termination of their guardianship or conservatorships—to whom the legislature has granted the right to court-appointed counsel—have the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceedings and may assert claims that their attorney was prejudicially ineffective.
The court adopted the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that their attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings. Although Strickland involved an ineffective-assistance claim following a criminal conviction, the court found that individuals who are the subject of guardianship and conservatorship proceedings may face similar substantial deprivations of liberty; thus, the same test should apply.
The court further addressed the procedure for raising such claims. When there are no new facts in support of an individual’s ineffective-assistance claim, they may raise it on direct appeal. In cases in which the basis for the claim is not apparent from the record, the individual must file a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The trial court’s findings will amplify the record if the motion is denied and the individual decides to appeal. In both situations, an individual pursuing an ineffective-assistance claim in guardianship or conservatorship proceedings must submit at least one affidavit that specifies the basis for the claim. Claims brought by direct appeal are subject to the deadlines set forth in the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure. Individuals who file a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding must do so within one year of the expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment in the proceeding.
The court found that the basis for R.’s claim was apparent from the record and that it could assess his claim on direct appeal. It found that there were no facts in the record supporting R.’s assertion that an independent psychological assessment would have established that he had cognitive deficits that limited his ability to care for himself. Consequently, the court ruled that R. had suffered no prejudice from the lack of the assessment and his ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit.
The court affirmed the probate court’s judgment.
Takeaways: States vary in how they provide counsel to adults subject to guardianship proceedings. Some states automatically appoint counsel for them, while others appoint counsel if requested or at the discretion of the court. In addition, some states appoint counsel only to act in the role of guardian ad litem, while others appoint counsel to act as the zealous advocate for an adult subject to guardianship (see John Pollock and Megan Rusciano, Right to Counsel in Restoration of Rights Cases, 42:4 Bifocal, A.B.A. (March–April 2021)).
In Guardianship of R., the court not only recognized the right to counsel but explicitly recognized a right to effective assistance of counsel in guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. The court went so far as to state “[W]here . . . there is a right to counsel, there is a right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Guardianship of R., No. Cum-25-331, 2026 WL 1292166, at *2 (Me. May 12, 2026) (citations omitted). The decision thus elevates run-of-the-mill guardianship protections to align with other severe deprivations of personal freedom, oftentimes in adversarial, involuntary commitment, or criminal circumstances.
Business Law
SCOTUS: Federal Court with Original Jurisdiction That Stays Proceeding Pending Arbitration Retains Jurisdiction to Confirm or Vacate Arbitration Award
Jules v. Andre Balazs Props., No. 25–83, 2026 WL 1336216 (U.S. May 14, 2026)
Adrian Jules worked at a Los Angeles hotel from 2017 to 2020, when his employment was terminated. Adrian sued Andre Balazs Properties (ABP), a company affiliated with the hotel, in New York federal district court, alleging federal and state discrimination claims. ABP moved to stay the proceeding pending arbitration under section three of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) based on an arbitration agreement Adrian had signed before starting his employment at the hotel. The court granted the motion. The arbitrator ruled against Adrian and awarded $34,500 in sanctions to ABP based on the misconduct of Adrian and his attorney.
ABP moved to confirm the award in the New York federal district court under section 9 of the FAA. Adrian opposed the confirmation of the award and moved to vacate it under section 10 of the FAA, asserting that the federal district court lacked federal question or diversity jurisdiction. The federal district court disagreed and confirmed the award. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split.
In a unanimous opinion, the US Supreme Court found that a federal court that has previously stayed claims in an action pending arbitration under section three of the FAA has jurisdiction over the original claims and retains jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration award resolving the claims is valid and should be confirmed, modified, or vacated.
The Court noted that the FAA itself does not create federal jurisdiction. Rather, a federal court must have an independent jurisdictional basis for granting relief under the FAA, such as diversity or federal-question jurisdiction.
The Court distinguished between freestanding applications to confirm or vacate—where the motion is made outside of any pre-existing federal case, for example, when the parties have arbitrated their dispute under their agreement but later file a motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award—and situations involving a motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award in a preexisting federal lawsuit that has been stayed pending arbitration.
The Court noted that in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2007), it had held that when a party files a freestanding motion to compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA, which authorizes relief if a court would have had jurisdiction over the dispute save for the arbitration agreement, a court should determine jurisdiction by “looking through” a section 4 petition to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy, even though that controversy is not before the federal court. The Court determined that Vaden’s “look through” approach was an anomalous approach grounded in the specific language of section 4. Jules v. Andre Balazs Props., No. 25–83, 2026 WL 1336216, at *4 (U.S. May 14, 2026)
However, Adrian relied on Badgerow v. Walters, 596 US. 1 (2022), in which the Court concluded that Vaden’s look-through approach does not apply to freestanding motions to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under section 9 or section 10: Those sections do not contain the same statutory language as section 4 and thus do not require the same look-through approach. To the contrary, the Badgerow court ruled that a court presented with a freestanding section 9 or 10 motion may not look through that motion to a controversy involving a federal issue not before the court to establish jurisdiction.
In the present case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Badgerow was distinguishable because the present action was not a freestanding one but rather commenced in federal district court as a federal question suit before being stayed pending arbitration. The Court agreed, noting that the federal district court had original jurisdiction over Adrian’s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The court held as follows:
It was this very jurisdiction that authorized the court to adjudicate the arbitrability of [Adrian’s] claims under the parties’ contract to begin with, before staying litigation pending arbitration. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction during the parties' arbitration. So when the parties returned to court after arbitration with § 9 and § 10 motions, the court had the same “jurisdiction to decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction to decide th[ose] motion[s],” that it possessed from the start.
Jules v. Andre Balazs Props., at *6 (citations omitted). The court determined that the FAA’s structure confirms this result: Under section 3, a court does not dismiss the case but instead stays the proceedings to enable it to supervise the arbitration to the end and thereby provide the FAA’s procedural protections. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Takeaways: The Court’s decision resolved a circuit split. The Third and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals had issued rulings similar to the Seventh Circuit (see George v. Rushmore Serv. Center, LLC, 114 F.4th 226 (3rd Cir. 2024), and Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC, 66 F.4th 1099 (7th Cir. 2023)), but the Fourth Circuit had disagreed (see SmartSky Networks, LLC v. DAG Wireless, Ltd., 93 F.4th 175 (4th Cir. 2024)), holding that Badgerow’s holding applied to all section 9 and section 10 motions, regardless of whether claims were filed in federal court before being resolved in arbitration. The Court emphasized that, for cases having original jurisdiction in federal court, its ruling not only enables the federal court to play the supervisory role envisioned by the FAA, but also ensures that the case—which remains on the federal docket, but stayed pending arbitration—can be resolved efficiently in the same court, rather than forcing the parties to file a new state-court proceeding to enforce or vacate their arbitration award.
Department of Labor Removes 2024 Overtime Rule and Reinstates 2019 Rule
Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales, and Computer Employees; Implementation of Federal Court Judgments, 29 C.F.R. pt. 541 (May 15, 2026)
On May 15, 2026, the US Department of Labor (DOL) published a technical amendment to implement the judgment of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 4:24-CV-499-SDJ, No. 4:24-CV-468-SDJ, 2024 WL 4806268 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2024), vacating its 2024 final rule revising Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regulations. The 2024 final rule increased the minimum salary level for executive, administrative, and professional (EAP) employees to $1,128 per week and the total annual compensation requirement for certain highly compensated employees (HCE) to $151,164 by July 1, 2025. EAP and HCE employees are exempt from federal minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA as those terms are defined in DOL regulations, which have included a minimum salary level since the FLSA’s enactment. The 2024 rule would have established a mechanism to automatically increase the minimum salary level every three years.
The amendment reinstates a 2019 final rule governing the exemption, setting the minimum salary level at $684 per week and the total annual compensation requirement for HCE at $107,432 per year.
Takeaways: The amendment enables the Code of Federal Regulations to reflect the vacatur of the 2024 rule and the reinstatement of the 2019 rule. For additional discussion of Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, please see our December 2024 monthly update.
AI and Legal Tech
Appeal Dismissed in Trust Dispute Due to Large Number of Inaccurate and Fictitious AI-Generated Citations
Ibach v. Stewart, SC-2025-0106 (Ala. Apr. 24, 2026)
In 2024, Laurie Ibach and Mark Campbell filed a lawsuit against their uncle, Bruce Stewart, alleging a variety of claims, including that he had breached his fiduciary duties as trustee of trusts created by their grandparents. The circuit court granted Bruce’s motion for summary judgment on all of their claims, finding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Laurie and Mark appealed.
In its majority opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs’ attorney, Perry Hall, had filed appellate briefs containing an “astounding” number of misquoted and fictitious cases in support of their arguments in both their opening and reply briefs. Ibach v. Stewart, SC-2025-0106, 7 (Ala. Apr. 24, 2026). The court issued an order requiring Perry to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for filing the briefs containing the inaccurate and fictitious citations. He moved to withdraw from representing Laurie and Mark. At the hearing, Perry admitted the citations were inaccurate and that he had used generative AI to obtain them. He apologized, acknowledged that sanctions were appropriate, and offered to reimburse Bruce for attorney’s fees and costs. Another attorney representing Laurie and Mark, who had not signed the briefs, filed a motion to allow each party to file a supplemental brief.
The court noted that the root of the problem was not with AI per se, but with the failure of attorneys to verify their AI-generated legal research. The court recognized the potential harm to the reputations of judges, courts, and parties whose names are used in fictitious opinions. In addition, the court noted that both Bruce and the court had expended substantial time and effort in trying to verify citations and cases that were misquoted or nonexistent.
The court found that Laurie’s and Mark’s briefs were wholly inadequate under Rule 28 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires appellants’ briefs to provide citations to legal authorities. Because they had failed to file a brief that was “even minimally adequate,” the court dismissed the appeal. Id. at 33. In addition, the court denied Laurie’s and Mark’s motion to file supplemental briefs, holding that the rules of appellate procedure did not contemplate providing an attorney who had filed an unsatisfactory brief to have a “second bite at the apple” by filing a new brief after the closing of the briefing period. Id. at 34. Such a procedure would not only be fundamentally unfair to Bruce but would also impair the court’s ability to administer justice efficiently.
The majority also found that, because of the numerous misquoted and fictitious legal authorities that Perry had provided, the appeal lacked any legal basis and was frivolous. The court held that sanctions for a frivolous appeal were appropriate under Rule 38 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court ordered Perry to pay Bruce’s attorney’s fees and costs and double any costs payable to the court. In addition, Perry was prohibited from making any other filings in the court unless they were signed by another attorney in good standing with the Alabama State Bar. The court also referred Perry to the Alabama State Bar for potential discipline and granted his motion to withdraw from representing Laurie and Mark, noting that, if he had not filed the motion, it likely would have disqualified him from further participation in the case.
Takeaways: Notably, in his concurring opinion, Justice Cook stated, “I believe that sanctions for the use of hallucinated cases generated by artificial intelligence (“AI”) should generally be imposed against the lawyer rather than the client. However, the particularly egregious nature of [Perry]’s conduct here compels a stronger result than a mere affirmance.” Id. at 39, 40. The court’s decision, and other recent decisions imposing severe sanctions for the failure to verify AI-generated legal research (see Couvrette v. Wisnovsky, No. 1:21-CV-00157-CL, 2025 WL 4109655 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2025) (court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims in estate dispute with prejudice and imposed $100,000 fine for repeatedly submitting briefs containing multiple nonexistent, AI-generated cases and quotations), signal a growing impatience among the judiciary with such violations of ethical and professional standards.
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